readers to make sure their entry into the heavenly kingdom by a constant practice of high virtue (vv. 8-11). Next come the reasons for this exhortation to virtue. It is a matter of duty with him, the sacred writer indicates, to warn his addressees-the more so as he knows that his death is not far distant (vv. 12-14) . He must indeed make provision for the future (v. 15).
At this point the sacred writer's outlook narrows to the question of Christ's parousia. There is nothing fanciful or artificial, he insists, in the apostolic teachings concerning the parousia (v. 16a). Two arguments are adduced in support of this assertion: the apostle's own vision of the transfigured Christ (vv. 16δ-18) > and secondly the sermo propheticus (v. 19a ). This second point suggests the counsel (v. 19δ) to which our text forms an adjunct, and serves to introduce the pericope in which we are interested.
The passage runs as follows:
19. And we have the prophetic utterances [τον τροφητικον Xòyov], surer still, to which you do well to take heed, as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until Day dawns and the Day Star rises in your hearts; 20. hoc primum intellegentes, quod omnis prophetia scripturae propria interpretatione non fit [τούτο πρώτον "γι,νώσκοντβς οτι πάσα προφητεία Ύραφής lôias επιλύσεως ου yíveraí];
21. for it was not by will of man that prophecy was brought of old; on the contrary, borne along by the Holy Spirit, men spoke from God. 3 As the dominant thought in this section of the letter is the parousia (cf. v. 16), and as the second part of v. 19 refers clearly to the time of that event, it is natural to infer that the sermo propheticus here mentioned denotes primarily, if not exclusively, prophecies concerning the Second Coming of Christ. It would appear, too, that these "prophetic utterances" are not oral pronouncements of Christian prophets like Agabus (cf. Acts 11:27 f.), but rather the prophetic sayings found in the Scriptures. Such indeed is the sense we should expect in the phrase προφητικός \oyos, a standard expression in Philo, 4 and in St. Justin. 5 Then, too, the sermo propheticus of v. 19 is surely 8 The translation follows the critical Greek text. The last part might also be trans lated, "men spoke on the part of God." 4 to be understood in line with the prophetia scripturae of v. 20. Now according to the ordinary force of scriptura in the New Testament, the scriptural prophecies here in view are those of the Old Testament. Hence there can be little doubt that the sermo propheticus is a col lective reference to the various Old Testament passages pertaining to the parousia of the Messias. J. B. Mayor suggests passages such as Mai. 4:2, Isa. 40:5, 9; 60: l. 6 Indeed, the quotation of Dt. 18:15, 19 and Lev. 23:39 in Acts 3:20-21 provides us with a Petrine example of parousiac prophecy.
The general tenor of the passage is clear. Such scriptural prophecies as were judged in apostolic times to refer in one sense or another to Christ's parousia bear convincing testimony to the truth of that coming event. These prophecies should be pondered and heeded by every Christian right down to the day of their fulfilment. They are the lamp given by God to illumine the path of the Christian across the dark night of the present. But while the sacred writer urges Christians to give heed to the utterances of the prophets on the parousia, he takes occasion in v. 20 to warn them of the attitude they must adopt toward the scriptural prophecies during the period of expectation.
Verse 20
Despite a few variants, 7 modern critical editors (Tischendorf, Westcott-Hort, von Soden, Vogels, Merk) are in agreement on the Greek text of II Pet. 1:20. And if we are to judge by the Editto Minor of Wordsworth and White, the Sixto-Clementine edition represents the true Vulgate text of this verse. It is, therefore, some what surprising that the Vulgate reads propria interpretatione instead of propriae interpretationis.
Perhaps the Vulgate reading was influenced by the pre-Hieronymian version, which held its ground for so long in the West. In the Fleury Palimpsest, a witness of the Old Latin text current in Africa, verse 20 reads: "omnis profetiae scriptura interpretatione indiget." reading interpretatione indiget is also found in Ambrosiaster, 9 in Bachiarius, 10 and thrice in the Liber Apologeticus commonly attributed to Priscillian.
11
Lagrange explains this Old Latin reading of v. 20 as a free rendering of the Greek text.
12
Were this point certain, the Old Latin reading would indicate clearly the way in which our Greek text was understood throughout the Latin Church in the first cen turies. However, the absence of propria and of the negative-two characteristics of the Old Latin of v. 20-may have been due to a variant Greek text now lost or to a misreading of the present Greek text. It is possible, for example, that ΙΔΙΑΣ was read in some MSS as ΕΝΔΕΗΣ.
13
In that event the omission of the negative would be almost automatic. Later on we shall refer to the form which v. 20 takes in Rufinus' translation of Origen. In any case, it is not im probable that the ablative interpretatione of our Vulgate is a residue of the Old Latin of v. 20.
That our text enunciates a general principle is clear from the very form of the sentence. The author speaks in this verse of omnis prophetia scripturae, not merely of such prophecy as has to do with the parousia. His mode of speech is all-inclusive. "No [πάσα ... ου] prophecy/' he says, "contained in scripture-and therefore no parousiac prophecy-í5¿as επυώσεως . . .yivercu,." Before embarking on our direct examination of this enigmatic phrase, a passing reference may be made to the interpretation championed by Estius and others, which gave prophetia scripturae the meaning "expositio scripturarum." 14 This view is no longer common nor can it be said that Estius' argu ments are at all convincing.
THE NOUN. pointed out that future discussions of II Pet. 1:20 would have to start from the fact that the term έπίλυσχ, 16 a hapax in the New Testa ment and LXX, has the meaning "interpretation" or "explanation." The statement is quite just. It would perhaps be sufficient simply to take note of the point and pass on at once to a discussion of the construction of the verse. Still, in view of the comparative rarity of the term, it may be helpful to outline the metaphorical usages of επίλυσα relevant to our text. A recapitulation of its metaphorical usages will serve to give us a feeling for the word and a keener ap preciation of its possibilities in v. 20.
As the noun is rather infrequent it seems legitimate to take note too of occurrences of the cognate verb tTihveiv. The tabulation will not be complete as there are several references which we have been un able to control. However, the following usages have been noted:
1) The solution of objections or fallacious arguments. Thus, Clement of Alexandria used the verb to designate the solving of difficulties raised by pagans against the parousia of Christ.
17
Philo used the verb to signify the exposure of fallacious argumentation.
18
Both noun and verb were used by Sextus Empiricus in this . sense. 2) The explanation of puzzling or mysterious statements, problems, etc. (a) The verb is used more than once by Athenaeus to indicate the explanation of puzzles or riddles.
20
The same usage is found in Josephus.
21
(b) An anony mous Greek translator of the Old Testament mentioned in Origene Hexapla used the noun in Eccles. 8:1 (7:30) to signify the wise man's interpretation of the difficult matters submitted to his consideration.
22
(c) The two terms seem to have been favorites of Aquila when speaking of symbolic dreams. In Gen. 40:8 he used the noun to designate the explanation which Joseph was to give of the mysterious symbols seen by the fellow prisoners of that patriarch in their dreams. 23 Here the LXX reads διασά^ησί-s. In that same verse, and again in a similar 16 Conjectural emendations of the text to exiXexrecos or εττηΚυσεω* are now universally abandoned. Likewise we may entirely disregard Spitta's emendation of tàuxs to ayias. 17 context "in the following chapter, 24 Aquila made use of the cognate verb in quite the same manner, (d) In the Greek version, no longer extant, of IV Esdras the noun seems to have been used to signify the interpretation of a mysterious vision. For we know that the term absolutio, found in the Latin version of IV Esd. 10:43, was not infrequently employed to translate βπίλνσις in this sense.
25
(e) Heliodorus (IV, 9) is said to have used the noun to signify the interpretation of oracles.
26
3) The explanation of stories and parables, (a) Aristotle used the verb in reference to the explanation of myths. The metaphorical use of our term and its normal connotation seem clear. Both noun and verb are employed to express the idea of inter pretation or explanation, and generally with a connotation of ob scurity or even mystery in the object of the interpretation.
In 32 Spitta's proposal (cf. supra, note 16) to give the noun the meaning "dissolution," and to interpret the verse after the fashion of Mt. 5:17 and Jn. 10:35 has been without influence.
apply that thought either to the readers' interpretation of prophecy or else to the explanation made by the prophets themselves. The latter view has two forms. Some commentators have taken "inter pretation" to refer to the prophets' understanding of the signs, visions, etc., vouchsafed them; others have understood the term to signify the explanation which the prophets might have appended to their proph ecies. There are, then, really three ways in which "interpretation" might be construed in our verse. Contrary to what is sometimes stated, the term έπίλνσπ admits of each of these constructions, as may be seen from the foregoing list of its usages. So far, then, as the noun is concerned, all three explanations of the word in the present text are possible. Our choice of interpretation will have to turn on further considerations of text and context. THE VERB AND ITS DEPENDENT GENITIVE.-Some older authors insisted that yiverai here must denote origin. According to Alford, who discusses this question rather thoroughly, the meaning of v. 20 would be: "no prophecy ... comes of private interpretation," or "proph ecy . . . springs not out of human interpretation."
33
If the predicate construction is so understood, it is obvious that "interpretation" must be taken to signify, in Alford's words, "not our interpretation of prophecy, but its resolution, or interpretation, by the prophets themselves."
Although predicate genitives of origin with ylyvoßai, are surely not impossible, A. T. Robertson is the only New Testament grammarian, so far as the writer knows, to favor that construction in II Pet. X : 20. Robertson regards ιδία* έπιλνσβωε as an "ablative case," a "case of origin, source,. . . ." It is true, of course, that yίpoμa^, is but rarely followed in the New Testament by predicate genitives; it is true too that in the few in stances where this construction occurs, the genitive is usually one of outright possession (cf. Luke 20:14, 33) or of measure (cf. I Tim. 5:9). However, the èyévero γ^ώμη* of Acts 20:3 is in all probability to be explained grammatically as a quasi-possessive genitive or genitive of pertinence . 3e With other verbs predicate genitives of this type occur several times in the New Testament (e.g., Heb. 12:11). As for the classical writers, this construction is rather frequent even with yiyvoßai. m This verb has then a force equivalent to our English expressions "become one of," "fall to (the lot, etc.) of," "belong to," "come under the scope of," etc.
With regard to II Pet. 1:20, however, it seems safest at this stage of the discussion to| concede that the predicate genitive tl|ere could be one either of origin or of pertinence. Yet the latter construction does seem to be the more likely one. For even though it would be excessive perhaps to maintain with Mayor {loc. cit.) that Alford's interpretation "attributes to yivoμaι a force which it could only bear if followed by the preposition e/c," still it must be admitted that New Testament usage (cf. Gal. 4:4; I Tim. 6:4; Heb. 11:12) would lead one to expect the preposition in Alford's interpretation.
Before entering upon the next phase of our discussion we must take note of the following point. Though a predicate genitive of origin in our text would necessarily involve the meaning "inter pretation by the prophets of the visions, etc., which they had received," a quasi-possessive genitive would not of itself limit "interpretation" in v. 20 to any one sense. On the contrary, several interpretations would still be possible according to the force given the adjective iotas. This adjective may indeed be regarded as the key-word of the whole verse.
THE ADJECTIVE.-It has become more or less customary to trans late iotas in v. 20 by "private." Still it should be remembered that neither the Greek word nor the corresponding propria of the Vulgate has that meaning of itself and apart from its context. 38 Indeed, ex cept for the phrase κατ' Ιδίαν, the adjective tStos seems hardly ever to signify "private" in the New Testament. The prevailing use of the word, with or without the article, is that of an equivalent for έαντου, 36 Cf. A. Debrunner, Friedrich Blass* Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch (Gòttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, ed. 6, 1931), n. 400, 7; pp. 227 f. 37 Cf. H. G. Liddell-R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940), s.v., II, 3, a (Π, 349). 38 The adjective "private" is more properly translated by ÍSUOTIKÓS (cf. e.g., IV Mach. 4:3), or by the Latin peculiaris, etc.
¿αντων {suus, or ipsius, ipsorum), expressing possession with greater or less emphasis: "his," "his own," etc. 39 Forms of this adjective occur relatively often in the Secunda Petri (cf. 1:3, 20; 2:16, 22; 3:3, 16,17). In II Pet. 3:17 it occurs in the sense of "your" or "your own."
This New Testament usage of the adjective-its normal usage in the Secunda Petri-must evidently be kept in view in our further discussion of II Pet. 1:20. We have noted above that neither the term "interpretation" nor the fact of a predicate genitive with yiverai points decisively either to the quasi-possessive construction or to that of a genitive of origin. It is now our task to examine how these two general constructions fit in with the reflexive connotation in herent in the adjective. And it is time, too, for us to take up several contextual considerations passed over in the foregoing pages.
The Hypothesis of a Genitive of Origin.-This construction, as we have said, makes Ιπυώσ*ω$ refer to an interpretation made by the prophets themselves, ¿ither prior to, or in the act of prophecy. "No prophecy comes of an interpretation" made by the prophets. It is, of course, a truism that prophecy is not derived from the prophet's unaided interpretation of signs and visions. The petition of the prophet Daniel (cf. Dan. 12:8 f.) for light to understand the vision granted to him has often been cited in support of the present hypothesis. 40 The thought is also to be found in Philo, 41 and in Hippolytus. 42 But is it the thought of v. 20? In this understanding of the text the possessive adjective would have to have the meaning "their own," with reference to the "prophets." This construction is very awkward, for no express mention is made of "prophets" either in the text or in the preceding context. It would, indeed, seem that the normal force of the adjective LÔLQS must be considered to rule out the genitive of origin construction. Nor is the situation much different where the adjective is translated 39 by "private." For the privacy in question must be that of the individual prophet or perhaps that of the prophetic circle. Neither "prophet" nor "prophets" have been expressly mentioned in the context. A further point. We conceded above that ¿πιλύσεω* might possibly be construed as a genitive of origin in v. 20. But against that pos sibility lie several considerations of context. Had the sacred author intended έπίΚύσβως to serve as a genitive of origin, he would have appended some dependent genitive such as οραμάτων, signifying "vis ions," "signs," etc. Ordinary clarity would have demanded some such addition. All the more so, as the foregoing term "prophecy," with its connotation of obscurity and mystery, could easily be taken by readers as the logical object of the process of "interpretation." The absence of a dependent genitive of object is a strong argument against the hypothesis of a genitive of origin in v. 20. We may note in addition that this construction does not smooth the connection between vv. 20 and 21. For v. 20 would be hardly anything more than a mere anticipation of the first half of v. 21. It does seem rather strained to find in v. 20 the idea proper to v. 21.
It is usual to cite, in support of the present hypothesis, the com mentaries-really two recensions of the same commentary-which pass under the names of the mysterious "Oecumenius" and the eleventhcentury Theophylact.
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A child of the Greek Catenae, as Staab calls it, this twofold recension is our main channel back to the exegesis of our text current in the Greek Church. We shall follow the Theo phylact recension: it happens in the present instance to be fuller than that of "Oecumenius." After a quotation of vv. 20-21 the com mentary proceeds: 44 The prophets knew the inspired words they were receiving from the prophetic Spirit, and the bearing of those words; still they did not know them in the exact detail in which those words were later fulfilled. It was for this reason that, as the Lord has said (cf. Luke 10:24), the prophets yearned to see the issue of their predictions.
45
Now Peter is here explaining why the prophets refrained from interpreting [ούχ ήρμηνβνσαν] their sayings; at the same time he distinguishes 43 Cf. Κ. Staab, "Die Griechischen Katenenkommentare zu den katholischen Briefen," Biblica, V (1924) There can be no doubt of the sense given in this commentary to v. 20. It would be interesting to know if this explanation of our text was taken from a major patristic writer. The commentator's preoccupation with mantic inspiration, probably that of the Montanists whose tenets persisted so long in the East, is evident in the text. Perhaps II Pet. 1:21a had been abused by heretics in an effort to exclude liberty from the concept of prophetic inspiration. At all events, this very preoccupation of the commentator lessens the value of his comments as regards v. 20.
Much has been made, too, of the fact that Bede and a long line of later Latin commentators support the interpretation which refers propria to the prophets. The venerable Northumbrian monk is explicit :
Pendet hie versiculus ex eo quod superius ait: "cui bene facitis attendentes"; qui enim prophetarum verba attendentes bene utique faciunt, ut per haec lucem habere possint scientiae, hoc primum intellegere debent, quia nullus prophetarum sanctorum propria sua interpretatione populis dogmata vitae praedicarit, sed quae a Domino didicerant, haec suis auditoribus agenda commendabant. .. . 46 However, it should not be forgotten that Bede is commenting the Vulgate text of II Pet. 1:20. The Vulgate reading propria interpretatione non fit all but imposes this mode of exegesis. But there is reason to suspect that Bede was not entirely satisfied with the exposition given. For, after a brief contrast of the methods pursued by pagan seers, he continues:
Sicut ergo prophetae non sua propria, sed Dei verba scribebant, ita et lector eorum non sua propria interpretatione potest uti, ne a sensu veritatis exorbite t, sed hoc omnimodis debet intendere, quomodo sua voluerit intellegi ipse qui scripsit.
The Hypothesis of a Quasi-P ossessive Genitive.-As we noted once before, several interpretations are possible in this alternative hypothesis. First there is the chance that tôias refers to the grammatical subject of the clause, to "prophecy," with the meaning: "no prophecy of Scripture becomes an object of its own interpretation." In other words, the sacred author would be stating that scriptural prophecy is not self-explanatory. A few authors seem to have defended this construction. 47 Though from the grammatical standpoint this construction is not impossible, it is more usual for ÏStos to refer to persons than to things. Furthermore it is doubtful that the sacred writer would express so obscurely a straightforward thought of this sort. In II Pet. 3:16, where a similar thought is recorded, he used the expression δυσνόητα (difficilia intellectu)-a clear-cut and unambiguous form of speech. In the present case he would probably have used δνσ€ρμψ€υτο$ (cf. Heb. 5:11) or some such word. Finally we may note that the inter pretation in question does not easily harmonize with v. 21. It could hardly be said, in support of the contention that prophecies are not self-explanatory, that "not by will of man was prophecy brought of old, etc."
Another possibility. The adjective íoías might be taken to refer grammatically to the intellegentes of v. 20. The phrase would then mean u your own interpretation." So understood, the adjective would refer directly and almost exclusively to the immediate readers of the Secunda Petri. There is, of course, no difficulty in referring the possessive adjective to a second person plural (cf. II Pet. 3:17). The difficulty of this interpretation lies rather in the fact that the term would function here as an indirect, and not as a direct, reflexive. The present writer has found no clear instance of this usage. Still more at variance with this construction is the fact that the scope of v. 20 is much broader than that of v. 19. The universal statement in v. 20 is not limited to any single group of persons.
There remains a third construction. Taking into account the personal connotation usual with ÏSios and making allowance for the universal character of the principle enunciated in v. 20, modern commentators generally agree in referring the possessive adjective, not indeed to the readers merely of the parousiac prophecies, but to any and all readers of the prophetic Scriptures. In this understanding of the passage, v. 20 may be translated: "no prophecy of Scripture becomes a matter {or comes within the scope) of one's own interpretation." The further shading and more exact determination of the force of "one's own" turns on considerations of context.
Clearly this explanation fits in neatly with the contents of v. 21. Some, it is true, who favored the genitive of origin in our text, urged that difficulty in the interpretation of prophecy is a notion alien to the preceding context. For, it has been argued, 48 the apostle speaks of prophecy "not as difficult of interpretation, but as a candle shining in a dark place, nay, as being even more firm and secure than external proofs of the same proofs." At first sight the objection appears to be not without force. Still, Bellarmine's answer remains valid today: "Respondeo hoc etiam loco (i.e., II Pet. 1:19) prophetarum voces vocari lucernam, non quia facile intelliguntur, sed quia intellectae illuminant et iter ostendunt ad Christum." 49 Truly, the objection is more seeming than real. To take a rather parallel case in our Secunda Petri, the sacred writer certainly appears to approve and encourage his readers' familiarity with certain letters of Paul (cf. 3:16) ; yet the author does not hesitate to observe that these same letters contain "some things hard to understand." It has always been considered a weak spot in the quasi-possessive hypothesis that the trend of patristic comment, as evidenced in Bede and in the Theophylact commentary, lay the other way. However, there is a piece of patristic evidence which offsets the reference of lotas {propria) to the prophets. So far as the writer has observed, a text in Rufinus' translation of Origen's Homilies on the Book of Numbers has never been quoted in discussions on the meaning of II Pet. 1:20. For the sake of clarity, the text must be quoted at some length: ' Some might wish to attribute to Origen the integral text just quoted; it will be safer, however, to treat this passage simply as representing the views of Rufinus (+ ca. 409). 51 Now granted that the text of II Pet. 1:20 is presented here somewhat freely, there can be no doubt that Rufinus understood the propria of v. 20 in a manner not consonant with the hypothesis of a genitive of origin. For, whether he was following the Old Latin text current at Aquileia, as seems to have been his usual practice, 52 or was rendering freely our present Greek text of v. 20, one fact stands out clear: Rufinus did not take propria as referring to the prophets. On the positive side, Rufinus' meaning is less clear. He may have meant, "no prophecy can be made manifest through one's own interpretation," and so have taken the phrase in accord with his previous remarks on the imperiti-the everyday readers of scriptural prophecy. More probably, however, he was emphasizing the thought of his master Origen, that prophetic speech is often to be taken in an allegorical sense, not in the sense suggested by the bare literal meaning of its terms. In either case, reference of propria to the prophets is excluded. This testimony from the great patristic age is surely as weighty as the comments of Bede and of the Theophylact commentary.
In the hypothesis of a quasi-possessive genitive, the sequence of the apostle's thought is clear. In the matter of the parousiac prophecies the essential point was the fact itself of the Lord's future parousia. become an object of attack. And so, the addressees of the Secunda Petri were exhorted to cling to the sermo propheticus-the divine testimony assuring them of the reality of that great event of the future. They should see in that testimony their source of light across the dark places of the present time. Yet they were to be on their guard against abuses in their devotion to the prophetic Scriptures. Some, for example, might urge that passages customarily taken in a parousiac sense had quite another meaning. Others might forget that there is much in prophecy that is obscure and enigmatic, that circumstances of time and manner may remain indefinite in prophecy without prejudice to the reality of the events predicted. The failure of the parousia to materialize was already proving a stumbling-block to many; some were even ready to attack the truth of parousiac prophecies. In such circumstances the apostle encourages devotion to those prophecies, but at the same time he warns his readers that it is not within the scope of "one's own interpretation" to decide what is or is not prophetic, or to determine and treat as prophetic circumstantial details outside the sphere of God's prophetic testimony.
THE POSITIVE TEACHING OF THE TEXT
The form of the general statement in v. 20 is negative; the term ISias, in its fundamental reflexive sense "one's own," is essentially relative. The positive force of the text will evidently turn on the question: To what is "one's own" contrasted in the context of the Secunda Petri? Several theories have been advanced on this point.
The Contrast
Mayor's Position.-J. B. Mayor put forth the thesis that "private" in our text stands in contrast to "general interpretation." No prophecy, he states, "is exhausted by one interpretation to which it is, as it were, tied." 53 Later on, in his Comments, he expresses his view more definitely:
Prophecy is not restricted to the particular meaning assigned to it by a particular man or a particular generation. The special work of the prophet is to interpret the working of God to his own generation. But in doing this he is laying down the principles of God's action generally. Hence there may be many fulfilments of one prophecy, or, to speak more exactly, many historical illustrations of some one principle of Providential Government. 54 88 Cf. Mayor, op. cit., p. 114. 64 Cf. Mayor, op. cit., p. 196.
Other considerations apart, one may indeed doubt that the author of the Secunda Petri intended any such meaning in v. 20. A message of this kind would have defeated the purpose of the apostolic exhorta tion pronounced in v. 196. The faithful, while urged to heed the prophecies-the prophecies pertaining to the final parousia, would at the same time be given to understand that the full meaning of those same prophecies is not exhausted by the parousiac sense attached to them! It is little wonder that Mayor's view has won few adherents.
Contrast with the Holy Spirit.-Most commentators, though with a variety of nuance that need not delay us, emphasize today the contrast between ίδιας and the divine author of the prophecies.
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The contrast is evident: "no prophecy of Scripture comes within the scope of one's own interpretation; for it was not by will of man that prophecy was brought of old; on the contrary, borne along by the Holy Spirit, men spoke from God." As prophecy is superhuman in origin, so no merely human interpretation will suit its contents. The meaning of a prophecy is the meaning intended by the Holy Spirit. And obviously, as many modern writers insist, there must be nothing arbitrary or capricious in man's interpretation of prophetic sayings.
The Organs of Interpretation
The Apostolic Leaders.-That the interpretation of prophecy must be in accord with the sense intended by the Holy Spirit, would seem to be the direct and immediate lesson of v. 20. But is that the full message of the verse? Is there not present, too, an implicit contrast with the judgement of the Church? Certainly the apostles' authorita tive teaching on the force and bearing of prophetic passages of the Old Testament cannot have been far from the mind of the sacred writer. His insistence on the position of the apostles (cf. II Pet. 1:1,13,16-18) and his antithetical mention of the "false-teachers" (cf. 2:1 ff.) make it legitimate to infer that in the sacred writer's mind resort should be had to apostolic authority to discover, in cases of doubtful or difficult prophetic sayings, the sense intended by the Holy Spirit. Nor should the evidence of Chapter 3 be neglected in this connection. Without adopting Ladeuze's hypothesis of an accidental transposition of II 85 Thus Bigg, Calmes, Chaîne, Feiten, Huby, Wand, Windisch.
Pet. 2:36-22 and 3:1-16, 56 there can be little doubt that the sense of 1:16-21 is next resumed in 3:1-16. And there the authentic character of the parousiac teaching of the apostles, as contrasted with that of the scoffers, is set forth very definitely. There are also other data in the New Testament to be considered.
According to St. Paul's teaching, as Bonsirven notes apropos of II Cor. 3:13-16, 57 it is a principle of Christian exegesis that the Bible cannot be understood save "by means of the faith in Christ Jesus." Jewish exegesis, through its refusal to accept that faith, was incapable of understanding fully the message of the Old Testa ment. The failure of the Jewish leaders to understand "the utter ances of the prophets which are read every sabbath" (cf. Acts 13:27; also 3:17) is stressed as an immediate cause of their final opposition to Jesus.
Still, mere possession of faith in Christ Jesus-so our text clearly indicates-did not qualify every individual Christian to expound the prophecies. To understand the associations which II Pet. 1:20 would evoke in the minds of the first addressees of that letter, we must take note of the manner in which the prophets were expounded authoritatively in the apostolic age. And from the scanty records which have come down to us, it is clear that the office of authoritative exposition was vested in the major Christian teachers.
At the very dawn of the Church's existence the risen Christ is described by Luke as "opening" the Scriptures to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus. Reflecting later how their Master "had interpreted [διερμήνβυσβν] to them in all the Scriptures the things referring to himself," Cleophas and his companion exclaimed in wonderment: "Was not our heart burning within us while he was speaking on the road and opening [öirjvoiyev] to us the Scriptures?" (cf. Luke 24:27, 32). It is significant that the term "opening" is akin to the term "releasing" [επίλυσα] used metaphorically in our text in an analogous sense. Now the power of "opening the Scrip tures," mentioned by the Emmaus disciples, was soon to be com- municated by Christ to His apostles. Shortly before the ascension, Christ in the company of the apostles "opened their minds that they might understand the Scriptures" (cf. Luke 24:45).
In the following decades several instances of authoritative inter pretation of the Scriptures are recorded. Peter (cf. Acts 2:16 ff.; 3:22 ff.), Stephen (cf. Acts 6:10; 7:1 ff.), Philip the deacon (cf. Acts8:29 ff.), James (cf. Acts 15:16 ff.), and Apollos (cf. Acts 18:28) stand forth as representative expositors of the Scriptures. There is hardly any need to speak of the numerous cases of scriptural inter pretation by Paul. Still, it is of special interest to note that on one occasion Paul's scriptural exegesis is described as an "opening" of the Scriptures. His evangelical labors at the synagogue of Thessalonica are thus described: "And Paul... reasoned with them from the Scriptures; explaining [= διανοί^ων, i.e., 'opening'] and showing that Christ had to suffer and rise from the dead" (cf. Acts 17:2 f.).
Making all due allowance for the habits of contemporary Jewish exegesis, the assurance and authority with which Paul founded lessons and even arguments on his typical interpretation of Old Testament passages, make it all but evident that the Apostle of the Gentiles was aware and confident of the divinely inspired character of those interpretations.
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The fact of their inspiration must have been ac knowledged by his fellow teachers of apostolic rank (cf. II Pet. 3:15). It cannot be doubted that both they and the primitive Christian communities looked on Paul's exegesis of Old Testament prophecy as the fruit of an inner teaching of the Holy Spirit. What is said of Paul in this connection, may be said with all justice of the other major apostles. Hence it seems only natural to infer that the ancient readers of our letter would see in II Pet. 1:20 an allusional contrast to the authoritative scriptural interpretations handed out by the primary Christian teachers of the time.
The Charismatics.-It is possible perhaps to go a step further. Authoritative interpretation of the Scriptures may well have been an appanage of the charismatics of the primitive Church. This aspect of our problem, while not new, is little noticed in modern discussions of our text. And yet the Secunda Petri should be studied against its first century background.
Cf. Bonsirven, op. cit., p. 273.
Two centuries ago, Calmet maintained that the power to interpret the Scriptures belonged to the charism of prophecy.
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The theory is deserving of some consideration. In Paul's hierarchy of charisms, 60 the prophets are normally listed right after the apostles. 61 Early Christians held these prophets in highest esteem. Paul himself shows a special regard for this type of charism (cf. I Cor. 14:1 f.). Like Agabus (cf. Acts 11:28; 21:10 f.) these charismatic prophets were wont to foretell the future. As preachers they were under some special guidance or even inspiration of the Holy Spirit. However, their connection with scriptural interpretation is less evident. For their preaching seems to have been directed more to the heart than to the mind; it seems to have been essentially paraenetic. Insofar as their work is described by St. Paul, 02 its specific aim was to edify, to exhort, and to console.
Teaching or didaskalia, the third in Paul's hierarchy of charisms, may with greater reason be considered in connection with scriptural interpretation. But first a word or two about these doctors or teachers.
In the very earliest period of the Church the charisms of prophecy and teaching might be found in the same individual. Thus, in the beginnings of the Christian community at Antioch, Barnabas and Saul and the other leaders of that great center are styled "prophets and teachers" indiscriminately (cf. Acts 13:1). Later however, after the founding of so many local churches, the didaskaloi, unlike the itinerant "apostles," seem to have belonged as a rule to definite communities. 63 Paul's celebrated statement in Eph. 4:11 is to be noted: "And he himself gave some men (to the Church) as apostles, others as prophets, others as evangelists, others as pastors and teachers [TOVS δβ ποψένας καΐ διδασκάλου*].. . ." The way in which Paul groups the last two charismatic orders under the same definite article, points to the conclusion that the "pastors" of the early Christian com munities were normally didaskaloi. u For the rest, a pastor would ordinarily have to be able to instruct his flock and so would have to exercise the work of didaskalia.
Although our information on this charism is rather meager, there is fairly general agreement that the didaskaloi were catechists raised up providentially and endowed with the "discourse of knowledge." 65 Their task was to provide the current teaching of Christian truth. Now as a very considerable part of the early Christian catechesis was taken up with interpretations of the Old Testament prophecies, it is difficult to evade the conclusion that scriptural interpretation formed part of the office of the didaskalos, that it pertained to the charism of didaskalia.
Bonsirven, 66 who in this follows Prat, would seem to hold that the catechetical discourses of these teachers were inspired. It would follow, too, that their scriptural interpretations were inspired. Yet the point would be difficult to prove. Lagrange denies the inspira tion of the didaskaloi. 67 Alio, in turn, defends the very reasonable view that the charism of didaskalia is to be taken in the broader sense of "grace of state." 68 These more moderate views do not at all belie the authoritative status of the didaskaloi in the primitive Christian community.
And now for the application of all this to II Pet. 1:20. If inter pretation of the Scriptures belonged to the office of the local didaska loi, the primitive addressees of the Secunda Petri could not fail to sense in the lotas επιλύσεως of v. 20 a contrast, not only to the explana tions given by the great apostolic leaders, but also to the interpreta tions offered by the charismatic didaskaloi of their local churches. And it is suggestive, to say the least, that pseudodidaskaloi, the "false teachers," should be introduced in the section of our letter (cf. 2:1) following the pericope in which we are interested. It is instructive to note that if these "false teachers" are to be identified with the "scoffers" of Chapter 3, 69 their primary error seems to have been opposition to the parousiac prophecies.
Our object in this paper has been to determine how II Pet. 1:20 was understood by its original readers in the first century-how the sacred writer intended this verse to be understood. The expression ιδία* έπιλνσβως lay in direct opposition to the interpretation intended by the Holy Spirit; indirectly, however, it suggested to its first readers a warning that their own interpretation of the prophetic Scriptures was not to be preferred to the inspired interpretations of the great apostolic leaders or to the official interpretations given by their local didaskaloi. In this sense, then, our text may be said to teach im plicitly the part of the Church's magisterium in the interpretation of the Scriptures. A note must now be added on the relation of our text to the celebrated Tridentine decree of April 8, 1546.
The Tridentine Decree and II Pet. 1:20
Assuming that the Tridentine decree on the interpretation of the Scriptures is entirely dependent on our text, 70 non-Catholic com mentators at times complain that the Fathers of Trent proceeded illegitimately in extending to the whole of Scripture what Peter had only said of prophecy. In answer we might recall that the complaint overlooks the less rigid use of the term "prophecy" in apostolic times.
The term "prophet" was commonly employed as a collective designa tion for all the post-Mosaic writers of the Old Testament. Not only the prophetae posteriores, but also the prophetae priores and even the writers of the hagiographa were thus designated on occasion. It is, of course, obvious that, as the term "Law" in combination with "Prophets" signified only the Pentateuch, the term "Prophets" in the common expression "Law and Prophets" must frequently have had this wider sense. the term "prophet" was not unknown in contemporary Jewish circles.
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As for the extension of the term ' 'prophecy' ' to the Mosaic portion of the Old Testament, it is well known that Moses was commonly regarded as the prophet par excellence. 73 There are even references to his prophetic status in the New Testament (cf. Mt. 11:13). Certainly the character of the Old Testament quotations which occur in Romans and Hebrews supposes the extension of the terms "prophets" (cf. Rom. 1:2; Heb. 1:1) and "prophetic writings" (cf. Rom. 16:26) to all the writers or writings of the Old Testament collection.
While it cannot, then, be said that the expression "prophecy of Scripture" in II Pet. 1:20 affords no basis for the decree of Trent, there is still need of great caution in determining the exact relation of the Petrine text to the Tridentine decree. Trent does not quote our text or refer to it in any way. Indeed the phraseology of the Tridentine decree is hardly reminiscent of II Pet. 1:20. 74 Furthermore, the causes that led to the enactment of that decree as well as its theological basis are very clearly set down in the Tridentine text. Finally, the acta preliminary to the decree make no mention of II Pet. 1:20. 75 We may, then, conclude that the Petrine text exerted no marked influence on the Fathers of Trent. Our text could, indeed, have served as a scriptural basis for the Tridentine decree; historically, however, our verse seems to have had no direct influence on it.
CONCLUSION
Lost in the shadow of the Pauline Corpus, the seven Catholic letters were left almost without commentary in patristic times. Our Secunda Petri shared the lot of its companion letters. Indeed, the special difficulties attending the authorship and canonical status of this document made it the least noticed of the group. In the modern reaction toward the Catholic Epistles no opportunity to contribute, however slightly, to their elucidation may be passed over. It is to be hoped that the statement of Rufinus to which we have called attention and our notes on the charismatic doctors may throw some light on a difficult passage of the long-neglected Secunda Petri.
